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This article presents a model in which two downstream firms compete in a differentiated 
product market and choose whether to adopt new advanced inputs supplied by the mo-
nopolist, while standard inputs are competitively supplied. When the monopoly supplier 
is independent, from the welfare viewpoint, the incentive to adopt the new inputs is in-
sufficient (can be excessive) given that the rival does not adopt (adopts). When the mo-
nopoly supplier and one downstream firm merge, such integration increases the unin-
tegrated downstream firm’s incentive to adopt the new input supplied by the rival and 
thus helps the spread of new inputs in the industry. However, because of the collusive 
effect of increasing the prices of the final products, vertical integration can be harmful 
for welfare despite the reduction in the welfare loss due to double marginalization and 
the increase in product quality. 
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I. Introduction 
Adopting new advanced inputs and announcing this fact broadly improves consumers’ 
awareness of final products, allowing firms to expand their demand. However, such new 
inputs are often provided by a limited number of input suppliers or even by monopolists, 
which supply them at less competitive prices. Considering the hold-up problem in 
which suppliers may name high prices in the future, committing to the adoption of a 
new input is thus risky for manufacturing firms. Therefore, they may hesitate to adopt 
such an input unless its demand-enhancing effect is sufficiently large. 
The following example highlights the type of situation on which this study focuses. 
In the early stage of development, Sharp was the only supplier of liquid crystal display 
panels made with IGZO (indium-gallium-zinc-oxide) and TFT (thin film transistor) that 
provided high energy-saving performance. Introducing such displays substantially im-
proves the quality of mobile phones, tablets, and laptops, and downstream producers 
can advertise their product quality by announcing the introduction of this new advanced 
input. However, the commitment to procure this input may be risky because no other 
input suppliers can supply this product, and thus Sharp may require a higher input price 
in the future. In fact, major downstream firms such as Apple have recognized the ad-
vantage of this input but not adopted it. We also observe a similar situation for the adop-
tion of organic electroluminescent displays for TV sets, where LG Electronics is the on-
ly supplier of large panels at a reasonable cost. 
In this study, we investigate the adoption of new inputs embodying advanced tech-
nology and analyze firms’ incentives to adopt a specific input that enhances their de-
mand. In the presented vertical model, downstream firms first choose whether they pur-
chase the high quality input that enhances demand from the monopolist or the standard 
input from the competitive market1 and then the input suppliers name their prices. We 
next examine the role of the demand-enhancing effect and provide the conditions under 
which firms adopt specific inputs. 
                                                 
1 Instead, we can interpret our model as one with a make-or-buy decision. Each firm chooses whether it 
procures the high quality inputs that enhance its demand from outside and saves the maintenance cost of 
production technology or maintains its production ability and continues to makes low quality inputs in-
side. For a discussion on make-or-buy decisions under price competition, see Sappington (2005). 
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We compare two cases. The first is the non-integration case in which the specific in-
puts are produced by an independent supplier. The second is the integration case under 
which one of the two downstream firms produces the specific inputs in house and the 
other downstream firm chooses whether to purchase these inputs from its rival or from 
the competitive market. 
In the first case (non-integration case), we analyze the equilibria in three subgames 
(i.e., no firm adopts the specific input, only one firm adopts it, and both firms adopt it). 
We show that if no firm adopts the specific input, the private incentive to adopt the spe-
cific input by a firm is insufficient from the welfare viewpoint, while if only one firm 
has adopted it already, the private incentive for the additional adoption of the new input 
by another firm may be insufficient or excessive. Thus, the private incentive to adopt 
the high quality input as a pioneer is always insufficient for social welfare, but that of 
the second adopter can be excessive. 
In the second case (integration case), we analyze the equilibria in two subgames (i.e., 
only the integrated firm adopts the specific input and both firms adopt it). We show that 
the decision to adopt by the rival firm depends on the size of the demand-enhancing ef-
fect. Only when the market-enhancing effect is strong does the rival firm also adopt it; 
however, this might be harmful for welfare. 
Finally, we compare the results in the non-integration case with those in the integra-
tion case. Counterintuitively, integration stimulates the unintegrated downstream firm to 
adopt the specific input. In other words, a downstream firm has a stronger incentive to 
adopt the new input when the rival firm supplies it than when the independent firm sup-
plies it. Moreover, we show that integration can be harmful for welfare, although it par-
tially eliminates the distortion from double marginalization, which by itself improves 
welfare. This is because it induces the unintegrated downstream firm to adopt the input 
supplied by the integrated rival. The adoption of the new input by the rival induces 
weaker pricing by the integrated downstream firm. That is, there exists an implicit col-
lusion effect in deciding higher prices. Thus, procuring new inputs from the rival in-
creases downstream firms’ profits and reduces welfare. Our analysis therefore highlights 
a new aspect of the possible anti-competitive effect of new technology adoption and 
vertical integration. 
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 Our analysis may also highlight the welfare implications of Yahoo’s search engine 
strategy that invokes intensive discussions in the anti-trust context (Harbour and 
Koslov , 2010). Yahoo tried to introduce Google’s advanced search engine technology 
to improve its search quality and save the investment and maintenance costs of its own 
search engine. The anti-trust departments of the United States and EU were against this 
strategy because it stagnates innovation in the search engine market, and finally Yahoo 
gave up introducing it. Our results suggest that Yahoo’s search engine strategy has more 
direct anti-competitive effects, which supports the judgment of the anti-trust depart-
ments of the United States and EU. Our results also imply that the adoption of the ri-
val’s input may have a direct price-raising effect in downstream markets such as adver-
tising markets, although a firm has an incentive to introduce the rival’s technology of 
the input. 
Our analysis can apply to other broad contexts such as Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity (CSR) procurement and biological inputs in the food industry. For example, firms 
often commit to purchase CSR-oriented inputs (e.g., child labor-free, CO2-free, fair 
trade products). Announcing the adoption of these inputs as CSR is appealing for con-
sumers and may enhance demand.2 However, few suppliers of these specialized inputs 
exist and firms adopting such CSR-oriented inputs may face a similar hold-up problem 
in our analysis. In particular, once firms obtain certification, it is difficult for them to 
switch from a CSR-oriented input to a non-CSR-oriented input even when the input 
price of the former rises 
Adopting non-genetically modified (GM) agricultural inputs is another example. 
Products made from non-GM soybeans are highly evaluated and can be sold at higher 
prices than standard products. However, non-GM soybeans are not popular globally, and 
few suppliers provide this input. Once a downstream firm advertises its products as GM 
bean-free, it is difficult to switch from the monopolistic supplier to competitive suppli-
ers that do not offer non-GM soybeans. Our result can thus apply to these situations. 
                                                 
2 Manasakis et al. (2013, 2014) and Liu et al. (2015) explicitly considered the market-expanding effect of 
CSR and examined CSR certificates and market structure. For intensive discussions of qualitative and 
empirical works on CSR, see Schreck (2011) and Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) for excellent re-
views. 
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Finally, we discuss the difference between our analysis and the literature on vertical 
foreclosure. As the seminal papers of Salinger (1988) and Ordover et al. (1990) demon-
strated, the possible anti-competitive effect of vertical integration enables the integrated 
firm to raise its rival’s costs. In their model, the input market is competitive in the sense 
that vertically unintegrated firms have the option to purchase inputs from outsiders. In 
our model, however, downstream firms first choose whether to abandon the outside op-
tion and commit to purchase the input from a specific firm.3 In the short run, this may 
be unrealistic because downstream firms will choose the supplier after observing the 
prices of other suppliers. However, it is difficult to pre-commit to a future price level in 
the long run, while firms often commit to a specific quality of the final product, which 
makes it difficult for firms to switch suppliers flexibly. Under such circumstances, it is 
risky to commit to the monopoly supplier. Surprisingly, in such a situation, vertical inte-
gration with the monopoly supplier of advanced technology enhances the adoption of 
the new technology by the unintegrated downstream firm. Moreover, we incorporate the 
demand-enhancing effect of the adoption of the high quality input that is not discussed 
in these works. Thus, we can emphasize that the adoption of the high quality input may 
be motivated by improving product quality. Nevertheless, under vertical integration, this 
may reduce welfare because of the collusion effect.4 
In addition to vertical foreclosure, this study is different from the discussion in the 
literature on entry deterrence by using exclusive contracts.5 In our model, each down-
stream firm has the option to deal with competitive input suppliers; if a downstream 
firm expects to be excluded, it never commits to adopt the input supplied by the mo-
nopolistic supplier in equilibrium. Instead, its reliance upon input procurement provides 
                                                 
3 For the same reason, our model formulation is different from those in the standard works on licensing 
such as Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1986), in which a royalty or fixed fee payment 
is determined before firms become licensees. 
4 Allain et al. (2016) suggested that vertical integration creates a hold-up problem. Our discussion is dif-
ferent from theirs because in our analysis a hold-up problem exists with and without integration and verti-
cal integration mitigates, rather than accelerates, this problem. 
5 See Rasmusen et al. (1991). For recent developments of exclusion by adopting exclusive contracts, see 
Wright (2009), Kitamura (2010), and Kitamura et al. (2017). For other discussions of anti-competitive 
vertical integration, see Matsushima and Pan (2016) and the works cited therein. 
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a cost-increasing effect, which might push up the price of competitive products. Thus, 
the entry deterrence effect does not matter in our analysis. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the duopoly 
model of a vertical structure. We analyze the non-integration case and integration case 
in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 compares these two cases and examines the 
welfare consequences. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
We consider a vertical model in which two downstream firms compete in a differentiat-
ed product market. Each downstream firm chooses whether to purchase advanced inputs 
from specific input suppliers or standard products from the competitive market.6 We 
normalize the standard (non-advanced) input price to zero. Let 𝑟 be the price of the 
advanced input. For tractability, we assume that the advanced input is supplied by the 
monopolist, firm U. 
Two downstream firms choose whether to commit to purchase advanced inputs. We 
assume that these advanced inputs increase the value of the final product. Therefore, 
consumers’ willingness to pay for firm i’s product depends on whether firm i adopts the 
advanced input. The utility function of the representative consumer is 
𝑈(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞𝑗) = 𝐴𝑖𝑞𝑖 + 𝐴𝑗𝑞𝑗 −
1
2
(𝑞𝑖
2 + 2𝛽𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑗 + 𝑞𝑗
2)    (1) 
where 𝛽 ∈ (0,1) represents the degree of product differentiation and 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖 are 
the output and price of downstream firm i (i = 1,2), respectively. We assume that 𝐴𝑖 =
𝐴∗ (𝐴𝑖 = 𝐴) if firm i adopts (does not adopt) the advanced input and 𝐴 < 𝐴
∗ < ?̅? =
𝐴 (
2−𝛽2
𝛽
) in order to ensure all the games discussed below have interior solutions.  
The inverse demand function and demand function of each firm i (𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) 
are, respectively, 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽𝑞𝑗 ,    𝑞𝑖 =
𝐴𝑖−𝛽𝐴𝑗−𝑃𝑖+𝛽𝑃𝑗
1−𝛽2
    (2) 
The profit of firm i (𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) is  
                                                 
6 Instead, we can interpret our model as a model with a make-or buy-decision. See footnote 1. 
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𝜋𝑖 = (𝑃𝑖−𝑐𝑖)𝑞𝑖   (3) 
where 𝑐𝑖 is zero if firm i adopts the standard input and r otherwise. We assume that the 
marginal costs of all upstream firms are constant, which are normalized to zero.7 
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, each downstream firm simultaneously 
chooses whether to commit to adopt the high quality input. In the second stage, after 
observing downstream firms’ decisions in the first stage, firm U sets r. In the third stage, 
downstream firms choose their prices simultaneously. 
3. The Equilibrium without Integration 
3-1 Third-stage competition 
We discuss the third stage in which each downstream firm faces price competition. 
From the first-order condition of each firm i (𝑖 = 1,2. 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗), we obtain the following 
equilibrium price: 
𝑃𝑖 =
(2−𝛽2)𝐴𝑖−𝛽𝐴𝑗+2𝑐𝑖−𝛽𝑐𝑗
4−𝛽2
   (4) 
3-2 Second-stage choice 
We discuss the second stage in which firm U chooses input price r. We now discuss the 
following three subgames. 
3-2-1. The subgame in which both firms adopt the standard input 
Suppose that both downstream firms adopt the standard input. In this subgame, the up-
stream monopolist, firm U, does nothing. By substituting 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐴𝑗 = 𝐴 and 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑗 =
0 into (4), we obtain the second-stage equilibrium outcomes shown in Table 1.8 
                                                 
7 It may be natural to assume that the production cost for the advanced input is higher than that for the 
standard one. Suppose that the cost difference between them is c. All of our lemmas and propositions hold 
if we replace A* with A** =A* - c. In other words, we can interpret A* as the net benefit (i.e., the de-
mand-expanding effect minus the additional production cost of the input) of adopting the high quality 
input. 
8 The first digit in the bracket indicates the decision of firm 𝑖 on high quality procurement and the sec-
ond digit indicates the decision of firm 𝑗 on high quality procurement. For example, 𝜋𝑖(0,0) denotes 
the profit of firm 𝑖 when neither firm 𝑖 nor firm 𝑗 adopts the high quality input. 
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Table 1. Equilibrium outcomes without integration when no firm adopts 
𝑃𝑖(0,0) =
𝐴(1 − 𝛽)
2 − 𝛽
 𝑞𝑖(0,0) =
𝐴
2 + 𝛽 − 𝛽2
 
𝜋𝑖(0,0) =
𝐴2(1 − 𝛽)
(2 − 𝛽)2(1 + 𝛽)
 𝐶𝑆(0,0) =
𝐴2
(2 − 𝛽)2(1 + 𝛽)
 
𝑊(0,0) =
𝐴2(3 − 2𝛽)
(2 − 𝛽)2(1 + 𝛽)
 
3-2-2 The subgame in which only one firm adopts the high quality input 
Suppose that only firm i adopts the high quality input. By substituting 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐴
∗, 𝐴𝑗 =
𝐴, 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑟 and 𝑐𝑗 = 0 into (4), we obtain the following profit of firm U: 
𝜋𝑈 = 𝑟𝑞𝑖 =
𝑟((2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽−𝑟(2−𝛽2))
4−5𝛽2+𝛽4
  (5) 
The first-order condition provides the equilibrium outcomes shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Equilibrium outcomes without integration when only one firm adopts 
𝑟(1,0) =
(2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽
2(2−𝛽2)
  𝜋𝑈(1,0) =
((2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽)2
4(2−𝛽)(1−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(2+𝛽)(2−𝛽2)
  
𝑃𝑖(1,0) =
(3−𝛽2)((2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽)
(2−𝛽)(2+𝛽)(2−𝛽2)
  𝑃𝑗(1,0) =
𝐴(8−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)−𝛽(2−𝛽2)𝐴∗
2(2−𝛽)(2+𝛽)(2−𝛽2)
  
𝑞𝑖(1,0) =
(2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽
2(2−𝛽)(1−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(2+𝛽)
  𝑞𝑗(1,0) =
𝐴(8 − 9𝛽2 + 2𝛽4) − 𝛽(2 − 𝛽2)𝐴∗
2(2 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 𝛽)(2 − 𝛽2)
 
𝜋𝑖(1,0) =
((2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽)2
4(4−𝛽2)2(1−𝛽2)
  𝜋𝑗(1,0) =
(𝛽(2 − 𝛽2)𝐴∗ − 𝐴(8 − 9𝛽2 + 2𝛽4))2
4(1 − 𝛽2)(2 − 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 − 𝛽2)2
 
𝐶𝑆(1,0) =
𝐴2(64−108𝛽2+53𝛽4−8𝛽6)+2𝐴𝛽(8−18𝛽2+11𝛽4−2𝛽6)𝐴∗+(2−𝛽2)
2
(4−3𝛽2)(𝐴∗)2
8(1−𝛽2)(8−6𝛽2+𝛽4)2
  
𝑊(1,0) =
𝐴2(192−372𝛽2+259𝛽4−76𝛽6+8𝛽8)−2𝛽(2−𝛽2)(36−31𝛽2+6𝛽4)𝐴𝐴∗+(2−𝛽2)2(28−21𝛽2+4𝛽4)(𝐴∗)2
8(1−𝛽2)(8−6𝛽2+𝛽4)2
  
3-2-3 The subgame in which both firms adopt the high quality input 
Suppose that both firms adopt the high quality input. By substituting 𝐴𝑖 = 𝐴𝑗 =
𝐴∗ and 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑟 into (4), we obtain the following profit of firm U: 
𝜋𝑈 = 𝑟(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗) =
2𝑟(𝐴∗−𝑟)
(2−𝛽)(1+𝛽)
  (6) 
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The first-order condition provides the equilibrium input price. We obtain the equilibri-
um outcomes shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Equilibrium outcomes without integration when both firms adopt 
𝑟(1,1) =
𝐴∗
2
 𝜋𝑈(1,1) =
(𝐴∗)2
2(2 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛽)
 
𝑃𝑖(1,1) =
(3 − 2𝛽)𝐴∗
2(2 − 𝛽)
 𝑞𝑖(1,1) =
𝐴∗
2(2 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝛽)
 
𝜋𝑖(1,1) =
(1 − 𝛽)(𝐴∗)2
4(2 − 𝛽)2(1 + 𝛽)
 𝐶𝑆(1,1) =
(𝐴∗)2
4(2 − 𝛽)2(1 + 𝛽)
 
𝑊(1,1) =
(7 − 4𝛽)(𝐴∗)2
4(2 − 𝛽)2(1 + 𝛽)
 
3-3 First-stage choice 
We discuss the first stage in which downstream firms simultaneously choose whether to 
commit to adopt the high quality input. We have the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. Define 𝐴𝜋(1,0) =
𝐴(4−𝛽−2𝛽2)
2−𝛽2
 and 𝐴𝜋(1,1) =
𝐴(8−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)
(2−𝛽2)2
. Then, 
𝐴𝜋(1,0) < 𝐴𝜋(1,1). In equilibrium, (i) no firm adopts the high quality input if 𝐴
∗ ≦
𝐴𝜋(1,0), (ii) only one firm adopts the high quality input if 𝐴𝜋(1,0) ≦ 𝐴
∗ ≦ 𝐴𝜋(1,1), 
and (iii) both firms adopt the high quality input if 𝐴𝜋(1,1) ≦ 𝐴
∗. 
Proof. Suppose that firm 𝑗 does not adopt the high quality input. 
𝜋𝑖(1,0) − 𝜋𝑖(0,0) =
((2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴(4−𝛽−2𝛽2))(𝐴(4−𝛽(3+2𝛽))+(2−𝛽2)𝐴∗)
4(4−𝛽2)2(1−𝛽2)
> 0 if and only if 
𝐴∗ > 𝐴𝜋(1,0) =
𝐴(4−𝛽−2𝛽2)
2−𝛽2
. This implies (i). 
Suppose that firm 𝑗 adopts the high quality input. 
𝜋𝑖(1,1) − 𝜋𝑖(0,1) =
(2−𝛽2)
3
(2−𝛽(2+𝛽))(𝐴∗)2+2𝛽(2−𝛽2)(8−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)𝐴𝐴∗−(8−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)
2
𝐴2
4(1−𝛽2)(8−6𝛽2+𝛽4)2
> 0 
if and only if 𝐴∗ > 𝐴𝜋(1,1) =
𝐴(8−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)
(2−𝛽2)2
. This implies (iii).  
Finally, 𝐴𝜋(1,1) − 𝐴𝜋(1,0) =
𝐴𝛽(1−𝛽)(2+𝛽)
(2−𝛽2)2
> 0. This implies (ii). Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 1 is intuitive. If the demand-enhancing effect is sufficiently large, both firms 
adopt the high quality input. If it is sufficiently small, no firm chooses the high quality 
input. If it is intermediate, only one firm adopts the high quality input.  
Next, we compare the profit of each downstream firm when only one firm adopts the 
high quality input. 
Lemma 2. 𝜋𝑖(1,0) > 𝜋𝑗(1,0) if 𝐴
∗ > 𝐴𝜋(1,0). 
Proof. 𝜋𝑖(1,0) − 𝜋𝑗(1,0) =
(2−𝛽2)2(𝐴∗)2+2𝛽(2−𝛽2)𝐴𝐴∗−(4+𝛽−2𝛽2)(4−𝛽−2𝛽2)𝐴2
4(4−𝛽2)(2−𝛽2)2
> 0 if and 
only if 𝐴∗ >
𝐴(4−𝛽−2𝛽2)
2−𝛽2
= 𝐴𝜋(1,0). Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2 states that if only one firm adopts the high quality input in equilibrium, the 
firm adopting it obtains greater profits than its rival. The adoption of the high quality 
input increases the firm’s profit directly by expanding demand. The change in the de-
mand parameter directly reduces the rival’s demand and thus reduces its profit. However, 
the adoption of the high quality input raises the price of the firm and this increases the 
profit of its rival indirectly. The former direct effect dominates the latter effect and the 
adoption of the high quality input thus reduces the rival’s profit. This leads to Lemma 2. 
Note that given that the rival does not adopt the high quality input, a firm adopts the 
high quality input only if it increases its own profit. 
This result has another implication. Instead of simultaneous choice in the model, if 
firms sequentially choose whether to adopt the high quality input, the leader chooses the 
high quality input when 𝐴𝜋(1,0) ≦ 𝐴
∗ ≦ 𝐴𝜋(1,1). Thus, there is a first-mover ad-
vantage in adopting the high quality input. 
We now discuss welfare. The welfare gain of the high quality input is caused by the 
increase in consumer value. However, because the market of the high quality input is 
less competitive than the perfectively competitive standard input market, adopting the 
high quality input raises the price. This yields a welfare loss. 
Define  
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𝐴𝑊(1,0) = 𝐴
𝛽(36−31𝛽2+6𝛽4)+2(1−𝛽)(2+𝛽)√(2+𝛽)(2−𝛽2)(84−𝛽(70+𝛽(62−𝛽(53+8(1−𝛽)𝛽))))
(2−𝛽2)(28−21𝛽2+4𝛽4)
 
and 𝐴𝑊(1,1) =
𝐴
(2+𝛽)√2(1−𝛽)(672−𝛽(768+𝛽(1140−𝛽(1320+𝛽(653−2𝛽(398+𝛽(69−𝛽(97+4𝛽−8𝛽2))))))))−𝛽(36−31𝛽2+6𝛽4)
(2−𝛽2)(28−𝛽(32+𝛽(21−2𝛽(5+2𝛽))))
  
Then, 𝐴𝑊(1,0) < 𝐴𝑊(1,1). We obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.  









              )1,1(  if
)1,1()0,1(  if
             )0,1(  if
)1,1(
)0,1(
)0,0(
)}1,1(),0,1(),0,0(max{
*
*
*
AA
AAA
AA
W
W
W
WWW
W
WW
W
. 
Proof. 𝑊(1,0)
>
<
𝑊(0,0) ⟺ 𝐴∗
>
<
𝐴𝑊(1,0) and 𝑊(1,1)
>
<
𝑊(1,0) ⟺ 𝐴∗
>
<
𝐴𝑊(1,1). 
These yield 𝐴 < 𝐴𝑊(1,0) < 𝐴𝑊(1,1). Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3 is intuitive. When the value-added effect of the high quality input is suffi-
ciently small (large), adopting the high quality input is harmful (beneficial) for social 
welfare because the higher prices (quality) induced by the less competitive (more valua-
ble) procurement reduces (increases) the consumer surplus. If this effect is intermediate, 
the welfare-enhancing effect of the high quality input exists but it is weak. Therefore, 
one firm’s adoption of the high quality input improves (reduces) welfare given that the 
rival does not (does) adopt the high quality input. 
We now discuss whether the private incentive to adopt the high quality input is exces-
sive or insufficient from the welfare viewpoint. 
Proposition 1. (i) 𝐴𝑊(1,0) < 𝐴𝜋(1,0). (ii) Both 𝐴𝑊(1,1) > 𝐴𝜋(1,1) and 𝐴𝑊(1,1) <
𝐴𝜋(1,1) are possible. 
Proof  
(i) 𝐴𝜋(1,0) − 𝐴𝑊(1,0) =
2𝐴
(2−𝛽2)2(28−21𝛽2+4𝛽4)
(𝐵 − √𝐶), 
where 𝐵 = (7 − 11𝛽 + 4𝛽2)(4 + 2𝛽 − 2𝛽2 − 𝛽3)2 > 0 and 
𝐶 = (1 − 𝛽)2(4 + 2𝛽 − 2𝛽2 − 𝛽3)3(84 − 70𝛽 − 62𝛽2 + 53𝛽3 + 8𝛽4 − 8𝛽5) > 0. Because 
𝐵2 − 𝐶 = 2(1 − 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)3(2 − 𝛽2)3((2 − 𝛽)(28 − 21𝛽2 + 4𝛽4)) > 0, we obtain (i).  
(ii) Fig. 1 shows that 𝐴𝑊(1,1) > 𝐴𝜋(1,1) and 𝐴𝑊(1,1) < 𝐴𝜋(1,1) are possible.  
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Fig. 1. Comparisons of the thresholds without integration 
Q.E.D. 
Lemmas 1–3 and Proposition 1(i) imply that, starting from the situation in which no 
firm adopts the high quality input, the private incentive to adopt the high quality input 
by a downstream firm is insufficient from the welfare viewpoint. Adopting the high 
quality input increases product value, which raises the consumer surplus as well as the 
profit of the upstream firm. However, a downstream firm does not take account of these 
effects when it chooses the high quality input. This yields the insufficient adoption of 
the high quality input. 
Lemmas 1–3 and Proposition 1(ii) imply that, starting from the situation in which on-
ly one firm adopts the high quality input, the private incentive for the additional adop-
tion of the high quality input by another firm may be insufficient or excessive from the 
welfare viewpoint. The adoption of the high quality input by firm 2 reduces firm 1’s 
profit. Because of this business-stealing effect, the incentive can be excessive.9 
We have thus far examined the case in which the superior input is supplied by the in-
dependent firm. However, such an input may be produced in house by downstream 
firms. In the next section, we discuss the case in which one downstream firm produces 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of the business-stealing effect, see Mankiw and Whinston (1986). 
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such an input and the other downstream firm chooses whether to purchase the input 
from the rival. 
4. The Equilibrium with Integration 
In this section, we consider the case in which one of the downstream firms, rather than 
an independent input supplier, produces the high quality input in house. This corre-
sponds to the situation in which firm 1 merges with firm U. 
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, firm 1 chooses whether it sells the high 
quality input to firm 2. In the second stage, firm 2 chooses whether to adopt the high 
quality input. In the third stage, firm 1 chooses the price of high quality input r. In the 
fourth stage, firms face price competition. 
It is obvious that firm 1 adopts the high quality input because 𝐴∗ > 𝐴. It is also obvi-
ous that in the first stage, firm 1 offers the high quality input to firm 2.10 Thus, it is suf-
ficient to discuss the following two situations. One is the case in which firm 2 does not 
adopt the high quality input (and thus only firm 1 adopts the high quality input) and the 
other is the case in which firm 2 adopts the high quality input (and thus both firms adopt 
the high quality input). Let the superscript M represent the integration case (i.e., firms U 
and 1 merge). 
4-1 The subgame in which only firm 1 adopts the high quality input 
By substituting 𝐴1 = 𝐴
∗,  𝐴2 = 𝐴,  𝑐1 =  𝑐2 = 0  into (4), we obtain the equilibrium 
prices and quantities including profits and social welfare shown in Table 4.11 
Table 4. Equilibrium outcomes with integration when only firm 1 adopts 
𝑃1
𝑀(1,0) =
(2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽
4−𝛽2
  𝑃2
𝑀(1,0) =
𝐴(2−𝛽2)−𝛽𝐴∗
4−𝛽2
  
𝑞1
𝑀(1,0) =
(2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽
(2−𝛽)(1−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(2+𝛽)
  𝑞2
𝑀(1,0) =
𝐴(2−𝛽2)−𝛽𝐴∗
(2−𝛽)(1−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(2+𝛽)
  
                                                 
10 This is because firm 1 can offer a sufficiently high price in the third stage. If firm 2 expects firm 1 to 
set such a high price, it never chooses to adopt the high quality input. 
11 The first digit in the bracket indicates the decision of firm 1 on the adoption of the high quality input 
and the second digit indicates the decision of firm 2 on the adoption of the high quality input. That is, 
𝜋1
𝑀(1,0) denotes the profit of firm 1 when it is the only firm to adopt the high quality input. 
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𝜋1
𝑀(1,0) =
((2−𝛽2)𝐴∗−𝐴𝛽)2
(4−𝛽2)2(1−𝛽2)
  𝜋2
𝑀(1,0) =
(𝐴(2−𝛽2)−𝛽𝐴∗)2
(4−𝛽2)2(1−𝛽2)
  
𝐶𝑆𝑀(1,0) =
𝐴2(4−3𝛽2)−2𝐴𝛽3𝐴∗+(4−3𝛽2)(𝐴∗)2
2(4−𝛽2)2(1−𝛽2)
  
𝑊𝑀(1,0) =
(12−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)(𝐴∗)2−2𝛽(8−3𝛽2)𝐴𝐴∗+(12−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)𝐴2
2(4−𝛽2)2(1−𝛽2)
  
4-2. The subgame in which both firms adopt the high quality input 
In this case, 𝐴1 =  𝐴2 = 𝐴
∗. The profit functions of both firms are as follows: 
𝜋1
𝑀 = 𝑃1𝑞1 + 𝑟𝑞2 =
𝑟((1−𝛽)𝐴∗−𝑃2)+𝑃1(𝑟𝛽+𝛽𝑃2+𝐴
∗(1−𝛽))−𝑃1
2
1−𝛽2
 (7) 
𝜋2
𝑀 = (𝑃2 − 𝑟)𝑞2 =
(𝑃2−𝑟)(𝛽𝑃1−𝑃2+𝐴
∗(1−𝛽))
1−𝛽2
 (8) 
The first-order conditions provide the following equilibrium outcomes in the fourth 
stage: 
𝑃1
𝑀(1,1) =
(1−𝛽)(2+𝛽)𝐴∗+3𝑟𝛽
4−𝛽2
  (9) 
𝑃2
𝑀(1,1) =
(1−𝛽)(2+𝛽)𝐴∗+𝑟(2+𝛽2)
4−𝛽2
  (10) 
𝑞1
𝑀(1,1) =
(2+𝛽)𝐴∗−𝑟𝛽(1+𝛽)
(1+𝛽)(4−𝛽2)
  (11) 
𝑞2
𝑀(1,1) =
(2+𝛽)𝐴∗−2𝑟(1+𝛽)
(1+𝛽)(4−𝛽2)
 (12) 
In the third stage, firm 1 chooses the high quality input price r. Its profit is 
𝜋1 =
(1−𝛽)(2+𝛽)2(𝐴∗)2−𝑟2(1+𝛽)(8+𝛽2)+𝑟(1+𝛽)(2+𝛽)(4−2𝛽+𝛽2)𝐴∗
(1+𝛽)(4−𝛽2)2
 (13) 
The first-order condition provides the equilibrium input price. Thus, we obtain the equi-
librium outcomes in the third stage shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Equilibrium outcomes with integration when both firms adopt 
𝑟𝑀(1,1) =
(8+𝛽3)𝐴∗
2(8+𝛽2)
   
𝑃1
𝑀(1,1) =
(4−𝛽)(2+𝛽)𝐴∗
2(8+𝛽2)
  𝑃2
𝑀(1,1) =
(12−𝛽(4−(2−𝛽)𝛽))𝐴∗
2(8+𝛽2)
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𝑞1
𝑀(1,1) =
(8+𝛽(2+𝛽+𝛽2))𝐴∗
2(1+𝛽)(8+𝛽2)
  𝑞2
𝑀(1,1) =
(2+𝛽2)𝐴∗
(1+𝛽)(8+𝛽2)
  
𝜋1
𝑀(1,1) =
(12+𝛽(4+𝛽+𝛽2))(𝐴∗)2
4(1+𝛽)(8+𝛽2)
  𝜋2
𝑀(1,1) =
(1−𝛽)(2+𝛽2)2(𝐴∗)2
(1+𝛽)(8+𝛽2)2
  
𝐶𝑆𝑀(1,1) =
(80+16𝛽+36𝛽2+24𝛽3+𝛽4+5𝛽5)(𝐴∗)2
8(1+𝛽)(8+𝛽2)2
  
𝑊𝑀(1,1) =
(304+𝛽(48+𝛽(108+𝛽(16+(11−𝛽)𝛽))))(𝐴∗)2
8(1+𝛽)(8+𝛽2)2
  
4-3 Firm 2’s decisions on the adoption of the high quality input 
We now discuss whether firm 2 adopts the high quality input in the second stage. We 
obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 4. Firm 2 adopts the high quality input if and only if 𝐴∗ > 𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,1), where 
𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,1) =
𝐴(2−𝛽2)(8+𝛽2)
8+𝛽2(2−𝛽(1+(1−𝛽)𝛽))
. 
Proof. We obtain 𝜋2
𝑀(1,1) − 𝜋2
𝑀(1,0) =
𝐷𝐸
(1−𝛽2)(32−4𝛽2−𝛽4)2
  
where 𝐷 = (8 + 𝛽2(2 − 𝛽(1 + (1 − 𝛽)𝛽)))𝐴∗ − 𝐴(2 − 𝛽2)(8 + 𝛽2) and  
𝐸 = 𝐴(2 − 𝛽2)(8 + 𝛽2) − (𝛽(16 + (2 − 𝛽)𝛽(𝛽 + 𝛽2 − 1)) − 8)𝐴∗. 
𝐷 > 0 if and only if 𝐴∗ >
𝐴(2−𝛽2)(8+𝛽2)
8+𝛽2(2−𝛽(1+(1−𝛽)𝛽))
= 𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,1) and 𝐸 > 0 if and only if 
𝐴∗ <
𝐴(2−𝛽2)(8+𝛽2)
𝛽(16+(2−𝛽)𝛽(𝛽+𝛽2−1))−8
. Note that ?̅? <
𝐴(2−𝛽2)(8+𝛽2)
𝛽(16+(2−𝛽)𝛽(𝛽+𝛽2−1))−8
, which is sufficient 
to prove the result. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4 is again intuitive. When the market expansion effect of the high quality in-
put is strong, firm 2 also adopts the high quality input. 
We obtain a similar result on the welfare consequences of firm 2’s adoption of the 
high quality input under integration. This is beneficial (harmful) for welfare if 𝐴∗ is 
sufficiently large (small). 
Lemma 5. There exists 𝐴𝑊
𝑀(1,0) > 𝐴𝑊
𝑀(0,0) > 0 such that (i) if 𝐴∗
>
<
𝐴𝑊
𝑀(0,0), 
then 𝑊𝑀(1,1)
>
<
𝑊(0,0) and (ii) if 𝐴∗
>
<
𝐴𝑊
𝑀(1,0), then 𝑊𝑀(1,1)
>
<
𝑊𝑀(1,0). 
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Proof. Fig. 2 shows that 𝐴𝑊
𝑀(1,0) > 𝐴𝑊
𝑀(0,0) > 0 for 𝛽 ∈ (0,1), in which 
𝐴𝑊
𝑀(1,0) denotes the threshold between 𝑊𝑀(1,1) and 𝑊𝑀(1,0) and 𝐴𝑊
𝑀(0,0) 
denotes the threshold between 𝑊𝑀(1,1) and 𝑊(0,0). 
 
Fig. 2. Comparisons between 𝑨𝑾
𝑴(𝟏, 𝟎) and 𝑨𝑾
𝑴(𝟎, 𝟎)  
Q.E.D. 
5. Comparisons 
We now discuss whether vertical integration enhances the unintegrated firm’s adoption 
of the high quality input. Counterintuitively, Proposition 2 states that integration accel-
erates the rival’s adoption of the high quality input. 
Proposition 2. 𝐴𝜋(1,1) > 𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,1).  
Proof. 𝐴𝜋(1,1) − 𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,1) =
𝛽2(1−𝛽)(1+𝛽)(2+𝛽)(16−12𝛽−𝛽2+5𝛽3−2𝛽4)
(2−𝛽2)2(8+2𝛽2−𝛽3−𝛽4+𝛽5)
 > 0. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2 implies that if both firms adopt the high quality input in the non-
integration case, they also adopt the high quality input in the integration case; however, 
the inverse is not true. In other words, both integrated and unintegrated firms are more 
likely to adopt the high quality input under integration. The result that the unintegrated 
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downstream firm has a stronger incentive to adopt the high quality input under integra-
tion may thus be counterintuitive. We therefore explain the intuition behind this result. 
Under integration, when firm 2 adopts the high quality input, firm 1 obtains the reve-
nue from firm 2 that is proportional to firm 2’s output given r. A higher final product 
price set by firm 1 raises the output of firm 2, resulting in an increase in firm 1’s reve-
nue from inputs. Therefore, firm 1 has a stronger incentive to raise its final product 
price when firm 2 adopts the high quality input. In other words, the adoption of the high 
quality input by firm 2 mitigates competition in the downstream market. Thus, the 
weaker competition caused by firm 2’s adoption of the high quality input increases its 
profit. Therefore, firm 2 has a stronger incentive to adopt the high quality input under 
integration. 
However, this does not imply that vertical integration is beneficial for firm 2. Integra-
tion reduces the marginal cost of firm 1 because it eliminates the double marginalization 
problem between firms U and 1. This induces stronger pricing by firm 1, which reduces 
firm 2’s profit. Proposition 3 states that firm 2 obtains smaller profits under integration. 
Proposition 3. Firm 2 always obtains smaller profits under integration compared with 
non-integration. 
Proof. We have to consider the eight adoption combinations between the integration and 
non-integration cases. 
(i) Suppose that both firms adopt the high quality input without integration. Then, from 
Proposition 2, both adopt the high quality input with integration, too. Therefore, we ob-
tain 
𝜋2(1,1) − 𝜋2
𝑀(1,1) =
(1−𝛽)𝛽(4−3𝛽+2𝛽2)(16−4𝛽+5𝛽2−2𝛽3)(𝐴∗)2
4(2−𝛽)2(1+𝛽)(8+𝛽2)2
> 0  
(ii) Suppose that only firm 1 adopts the high quality input with and without integration. 
This happens only when 𝐴∗ < 𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,1).   Then, we have 𝜋2
𝑀(1,0) > 𝜋2(1,0) if 
and only if 𝐴∗ >
𝐴(16−17𝛽2+4𝛽4)
6𝛽−3𝛽3
. Because 
𝐴(16−17𝛽2+4𝛽4)
6𝛽−3𝛽3
> 𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,1), we can show 
that 𝜋2
𝑀(1,0) > 𝜋2(1,0) never holds in this case. 
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(iii) Suppose that only firm 1 adopts the high quality input with integration and both 
adopt the high quality input without integration. This contradicts Proposition 2 and thus 
it never takes place. 
(iv) Suppose that both firms adopt the high quality input with integration but only firm 1 
adopts the high quality input without integration. This happens only when 𝐴∗ >
𝐴𝜋(1,1). We obtain 𝜋2
𝑀(1,1) > 𝜋2(1,0) if and only if 𝐴
∗ >
𝐴(8+𝛽2)(8−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)
(2−𝛽2)(16−𝛽(8−𝛽(4−𝛽(3+2(1−𝛽)𝛽))))
. Because 
𝐴(8+𝛽2)(8−9𝛽2+2𝛽4)
(2−𝛽2)(16−𝛽(8−𝛽(4−𝛽(3+2(1−𝛽)𝛽))))
>
𝐴𝜋(1,1),  𝜋2
𝑀(1,1) > 𝜋2(1,0) never holds in this case. 
(v) Suppose that only firm 2 adopts the high quality input without integration and only 
firm 1 adopts the high quality input with integration. As we showed in Lemma 2, in the 
non-integration case, the firm that does not adopt the high quality input obtains smaller 
profits. In addition, firm 1’s marginal cost is lower under integration. Both effects re-
duce firm 2’s profit, while there is no effect of increasing firm 2’s profit. Therefore, firm 
2’s profit is smaller with integration. 
(vi) Suppose that only firm 2 adopts the high quality input without integration and both 
firms adopt the high quality input with integration. Then, firm 2 earns a larger profit 
than that when only firm 1 adopts the high quality input without integration from Lem-
ma 2. We also showed in (iv) that integration reduces firm 2’s profit even when only 
firm 1 adopts the high quality input without integration. These two facts imply that inte-
gration reduces firm 2’s profit in this case, too. 
(vii) Suppose that no firm adopts the high quality input without integration and only 
firm 1 adopts the high quality input with integration. The adoption of the high quality 
input by firm 1 reduces firm 2’s profit and vertical integration reduces firm 1’s cost, 
which makes firm 1 stronger. Both effects reduce firm 2’s profit, while there is no effect 
of increasing firm 2’s profit. Therefore, firm 2’s profit is smaller with integration. 
(viii) Suppose that no firm adopts the high quality input without integration and both 
firms adopt the high quality input with integration. This happens only when 𝐴∗ <
𝐴𝜋(1,0). 𝜋2
𝑀(1,1) > 𝜋2(0,0) if and only if 𝐴
∗ >
𝐴(8+𝛽2)
4−2𝛽+2𝛽2−𝛽3
. Because 
𝐴(8+𝛽2)
4−2𝛽+2𝛽2−𝛽3
> 𝐴𝜋(1,0), 𝜋2
𝑀(1,1) > 𝜋2(0,0) never holds in this case. Q.E.D. 
 19 
 
Integration increases the joint profits of firms U and 1. The merged firm’s profit can 
increase through two channels. First, the merged firm internalizes the problem of double 
marginalization between the upstream and downstream firms (firm U and firm 1). Sec-
ond, as shown in Proposition 2, vertical integration induces the rival to adopt the new 
inputs, and integration induces weaker price competition when both firms adopt the new 
inputs. This collusive effect increases the profit of firm 1.12 
Because this collusive effect harms consumer welfare, integration involves a trade-off 
in welfare. On one hand, it mitigates the double marginalization problem between firm 
U and 1. On the other hand, it enhances the adoption of the new input by firm 2 and this 
makes the market less competitive. It is ambiguous whether the former welfare-
enhancing effect dominates the latter welfare-reducing effect. 
Proposition 4 (i) Suppose that the pattern of the high quality input adoption does not 
change with and without integration; then, integration always improves welfare. (ii) 
When integration encourages firm 2’s adoption of the high quality input, integration 
may harm welfare. 
Proof (i) First, suppose that both firms adopt the high quality input with and without 
integration. Then, we obtain 
𝑊𝑀(1,1) − 𝑊(1,1)
=
(1 − 𝛽)(320 − 192𝛽 + 128𝛽2 − 64𝛽3 + 10𝛽4 − 14𝛽5 + 𝛽6)(𝐴∗)2
8(2 − 𝛽)2(1 + 𝛽)(8 + 𝛽2)2
> 0 
Second, suppose that only firm 1 adopts the high quality input with and without integra-
tion. This happens only when 𝐴𝜋(1,0) ≦ 𝐴
∗. Then, we have 𝑊𝑀(1,0) > 𝑊(1,0) if 
and only if 𝐴∗ >
𝐴𝛽(36−35𝛽2+8𝛽4)
(2−𝛽2)(20−15𝛽2+4𝛽4)
. Because 𝐴𝜋(1,0) >
𝐴𝛽(36−35𝛽2+8𝛽4)
(2−𝛽2)(20−15𝛽2+4𝛽4)
, we can 
show that this always holds. 
                                                 
12 This anti-competitive effect appears even under passive vertical integration in which downstream 
firms acquire financial interests in the supplier without controlling right. See Hunold and Stahl (2016). 
See also Flath (1989) and Greenlee and Raskovich (2006).    
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(ii) Fig. 3 shows that 𝐴𝑊
𝑀(1,0) > 𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,0)(= 𝐴) and 𝐴𝑊
𝑀(0,0) > 𝐴𝜋
𝑀(1,1) are 
possible. 
 
Fig. 3. Comparisons of the thresholds with integration 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4(i) states that under the same pattern of the high quality input adoption, 
the welfare-improving effect (from eliminating double marginalization) dominates the 
welfare-reducing effect (inducing implicit collusion). Thus, although both firms’ adop-
tion of the high quality input induces weaker price competition, it is socially desirable.  
However, Proposition 4(ii) states that if integration changes the pattern of the high 
quality input adoption, this might reduce welfare. In particular, Fig. 3 shows that if ver-
tical integration induces firm 2 to newly adopt the high quality input, it will be harmful 
to welfare when both A and 𝛽 are high (the shaded area in Fig. 3). 
6. Conclusion 
We formulate a model in which two downstream firms choose whether they commit to 
adopt the high quality input before observing the input prices. We find that given that 
the rival does not adopt the high quality input, the private incentive to adopt the high 
quality input of the other firm is too small from the welfare viewpoint. By contrast, giv-
en that the rival adopts the high quality input, the private incentive to adopt the high 
 21 
 
quality input is ambiguous. These results suggest that the first adopter of a new high 
quality input should be promoted, whereas the second adopter might not be. 
Next, we investigate the case in which one downstream firm and the high quality in-
put supplier merge. We find that integration enhances the adoption of the high quality 
input by the rival. This is because a firm’s adoption of the inputs produced by the rival 
firm induces the rival’s higher price in the downstream market, which increases its prof-
it. Although integration enhances the adoption of the high quality input, it may be harm-
ful for welfare because of the weaker competition in the final product market. 
Finally, we discuss future research directions. A simplified model with a monopolistic 
high quality input provider and duopolistic competition in the downstream market 
should be further examined. For example, incorporating the competition effect into the 
input market with different production technologies would be an interesting topic for 
future research. We also assumed that the high quality input increases product value in a 
perfectly asymmetric way. If another channel can induce consumers’ preferences to 
change, however, this imperfection of asymmetric effects among firms may yield differ-
ent implications. Finally, we need to generalize the hold-up problem with high quality 
procurement into a multi-period or dynamic model. Nevertheless, this study provides a 
platform from which future works can address these important issues. 
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